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In recent years, numerous observers have argued that global competition, increased reliance on contingent workers, and the breakdown of implicit contracts have made compensation practices in the United States more flexible; in particular, employers have become more concerned with how an employee's pay compares to that in other firms and less concerned with considerations of equity or relative pay within the firm. This paper uses establishment-level data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Employment Cost Index program to examine this claim by asking whether the variances of compensation within and between establishments have moved in a more "flexible" direction over the 1980s and 1990s. We find evidence consistent with increased flexibility.
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In broad terms, the differences in the growth rates of pay among industry and 2 occupation groups in the ECI is consistent with these findings (Lettau 1999) .
A large literature has documented an increase in the overall dispersion of wages across workers, as opposed to jobs, over the period we study. Although institutional factors such as 2 decreasing unionization and the erosion of the minimum wage have been cited as partially responsible, most observers have attributed the bulk of the increase in wage dispersion to an increase in the "physical" return to skill, probably due to skill-biased technical change. These two broad explanations -decompression vs. skill-biased technical change -have similar implications for the dispersion of compensation across workers, and across jobs within establishments. But they have different implications for the dispersion of compensation across establishments. These differences allow us to find evidence of decompression even against a backdrop of skill-biased technical change.
II. Analytical Framework
As employment relationships move, however modestly, in the direction of spot markets, we would expect to see rates of pay become more responsive to the supply and demand for each occupation or set of skills, and less responsive to the institutions of the firm or considerations of equity, etc.. Intuitively, then, we would expect to see greater variation in pay levels across occupations within establishments, as employers discard policies of wage compression in favor of "meeting the market". Another implication is that we should see less variation in pay levels across establishments within occupations, as firm-specific institutional constraints become less binding, and increased mobility of workers across firms forces employers to be more concerned with workers' opportunity wages elsewhere.
However, other developments, notably skill-biased technical change, could have similar effects. A shift in relative demands for occupations in favor of higher-paid occupations during the period in question would also produce an increase in the variation in pay levels across occupations within establishments. However, we would not necessarily expect such a shift to influence the between-establishment variation in the same way as a policy of "decompression" would.
A fully specified model is beyond the scope of this paper. However, our analytical framework can be illustrated by a simple representation of pay-setting behavior.
Let w = log of the rate of pay for occupation s in establishment i , Assume that (1) w = (1-)*(mrp + *e ) + *w .
That is, the rate of pay for an occupation in an establishment deviates from the mrp for that occupation in two ways. The first is that there is some degree of wage compression across occupations, indexed by . This may arise out of notions of fairness (Akerlof 1984 , Akerlof and Yellen 1988 , worker harmony (Lazear 1986) or from the value workers place on relative pay (Frank 1984) . The second is that the firm shares quasi-rents or profits with workers, whether formally or not (Hildreth and Oswald 1997, Katz and Summers 1989) , with the degree of sharing indicated by .
Averaging (1) over occupations within an establishment and substituting back in yields (2) w = *e + (1-)*mrp + *mrp .
The total variance of w can be divided into the mean of the variance across occupations Therefore, as wage-setting moves away from institutional considerations that favor wage compression, we should expect the within-establishment variance of pay rates to rise.
The variance across establishments of the establishment-mean level of w (averaged over all occupations) is (5) var(w ) = *var(e ) + var(mrp ) + 2 *cov(e ,mrp ) .
Naturally, this variance is unaffected by the degree of wage compression within establishments, as long as the establishment's mean wage is unaffected. Because the overall variance is the sum of the within-establishment and between-establishment variances, this implies that decompression should increase the overall variance in pay levels (across occupation-establishment cells) as well.
The variance of w across establishments within a given occupation s is In the extreme case that the mrp of an occupation is the same in all establishments, this derivative becomes 2 *var(mrp ) + 2 *cov (e ,mrp ). The first term is positive, and the second i i i s term is probably positive as well, because there would seem to be more "rents" to share, and the workers are in a better position to win a share of them, when the workers are higher skilled.
Thus, the derivative can be reasonably assumed to be positive. As we move sufficiently away from this extreme, the sign of the derivative becomes ambiguous, but we consider it likely that the However, the between-establishment/within-occupation variance should also fall if 3 establishments become more similar in their shared "rents", their distributions of occupations, their mrp for a given occupation, or the covariances among these elements.
variation in mrp within occupation is small relative to the overall variance in mrp across occupations and establishments. Therefore, as wage-setting moves away from institutional considerations that favor wage compression, we would expect variance across establishments but within an occupation to fall.
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We can expand this representation of pay-setting in a simple fashion to incorporate an increase in the productivity of skill. Let k be the skill level of occupation s in establishment i. In sum, we would expect a policy of decompression associated with a decline in the importance of institutional and internal factors relative to outside market conditions, to result in i) an increase in the average variance of pay levels across occupations within establishments, ii) no change in the variance of average pay levels across establishments, iii) a decrease in the average variance of pay levels across establishments within occupations.
We would expect an increase in the marginal product of skill to result in i) an increase in the average variance of pay levels across occupations within establishments,
ii) an increase in the variance of average pay levels across establishments,
iii) an increase in the average variance of pay levels across establishments within occupations.
Other researchers have suggested other implications based on more complex views of pay setting. Theoretical models by Caselli (1999) and Kremer and Maskin (1996) for efficient production at their firm. In some establishments, a wide range of tasks requires a wide range of skills which would lead an employer to have a mixed workforce with less segregation by skill. If workers are paid their marginal product, these establishments will have a very high within-establishment wage dispersion matching the dispersion of marginal products.
The more similar are the tasks at an establishment, the more complementarities arise from having similar workers at a given firm. This would be seen as a more compressed wage structure since the employees have more similar skills.
Skill-biased technical change should then lead to an increase in across establishment wage variation and a decrease in within establishment wage variation. Because the sample of occupations is fixed at the beginning of sample period in the ECI, compositional changes in the mix of jobs within an establishment will not be seen. If segregation by skill is occurring, however, then as new firms replenish the sample, they would have more similar workforces due to the skillbiased technical change.
In this case, we would expect to see i) decrease in the average variance of pay levels across occupations within establishments (as skill-segregated establishments replace less segregated establishments),
ii) an increase in the variance of average pay levels across establishments (due to sorting),
iii) an increase in the average variance of pay levels across establishments within occupations (as high skilled workers at high skilled plants are more productive than high skilled workers at low skilled plants).
The following decrease in variance between establishments for similar jobs should be taken as evidence that decompression has been the dominant factor, while an overall decrease in within-establishment variance would argue in favor of sorting as the dominant influence, and an increase in both variances would give the leading role to skill-biased technical change itself.
III. Data
Each quarter, the Employment Cost Index (ECI) program collects data on various components of compensation per hour for a large number of jobs representing specific occupations within more than 4,000 private establishments throughout the United States. An establishment typically remains in the sample for about 20 consecutive quarters before being replaced by another in the same industry. The ECI also includes data for state and local governments, but in this study we use only the data pertaining to private industry. Note that data are collected for only a sample of jobs within each establishment, with a median of 5 jobs per establishment. The jobs are selected randomly, in proportion to the number of workers in that job at the establishment, and so are likely to be those in which the establishment's workers are concentrated. However, they do not represent a census of jobs in the establishment. Each establishment is assigned a weight at initialization, which does not change over time.
We use the micro-level data from the ECI as an unbalanced panel of observations on jobs within establishments. The sample covers the period 1980:Q1 to 1999:Q2. We began with the same sample of observations as used to calculated the published ECI (which, for example, excludes observations without positive wages and salaries per hour). However, the sampling scheme for the ECI results in only one or two jobs being sampled for some establishments.
Because one focus of this paper is on variances across jobs, and since these variances are not estimated well from just a couple of jobs, we restricted our sample to those establishments in which at least 4 jobs were sampled. In order to avoid complications arising from the seasonality of pay-setting, we also restrict our analysis to data that refers to the same month in each yearto June, in particular.
In addition, we trimmed the data set by excluding observations with wages and salaries per hour in the top and bottom 0.5 percent of the unrestricted distribution in each year. Over the entire range of the sample, this had the effect of dropping all observations with wages and salaries per hour less than $2.30 or greater than $75.00. We further trimmed observations with voluntary benefits (defined below) in the top 0.5 percent of the distribution in each year.
In the end we are left with a sample comprising 312,988 observations of jobs within establishments over 19 years. The number of observations ranges from 6,728 in 1980 to 22, 404 in 1990, and the number of establishments represented ranges from 1,030 in 1980 to 3,809 in 1999. Some summary statistics for the sample are shown in table 1.
For the purposes of this study we exclude from compensation those components of benefits that are mandated by law. These include Social Security, Medicare, railroad retirement, Railroad retirement benefits appeared as a separate category in the ECI only until June 4 1995, and medicare taxes were included as a separate category only beginning June 1995.
In June 1995, the ECI program reclassified various pension, retirement, savings, and 5 thrift plans into the categories of defined benefit retirement defined contribution retirement plans. This change did not, however, affect the aggregate of these categories.
Of course, several of these components of compensation are voluntary only within 6 limits prescribed by various laws and regulations.
In these cases, an initial value was collected, but values were imputed for quarters for 7 which changes from the previous quarter were no reported.
Of the components of benefits that we will highlight below, analysis.
We analyze the log of the level of compensation or its components rather than level itself. This serves to make the variance insensitive to the general nominal level of compensation. When analyzing a component of compensation for which any non-trimmed observation has a zero value, we add (year by year) the mean of that component to every observation. 
IV. Variances
We argued above that the flexibility of compensation practices, in the particular sense of the ability or willingness of employers to tailor compensation to the market conditions relevant to each job individually, should manifest itself in the degree of variation in rates of compensation among jobs or establishments. In particular, we argued that as compensation practices move in the direction of spot markets, we should expect to see the variance of compensation across occupations within establishments rise, and to see the variance across establishments within occupation fall, while leaving the variance across establishments means relatively unaffected. In this section we examine how these quantities have changed over time, before moving on to regression analysis in the next section.
We first look at the variance in compensation across jobs within establishments. We compute the mean across establishments of the variance across jobs of the log level of compensation within each establishment. That is, we compute where i indexes establishments, j indexes jobs within establishments, t indexes time, and c is the log level of compensation (or in a component of compensation).
In computing the variance across jobs within an establishment, we would like to weight each job by the proportion of the establishment's workforce that the job represents, as well as the relative size of the establishment as a whole. Our data do not, unfortunately, include information
Because wages and salaries are such a large proportion of voluntary compensation, in 10 most figures we include only graphs for wages and salaries and for benefits.
Although there are other differences in concept and measurement that may render data 11 from these two sources less than strictly comparable, in general one would expect the variance in the ECI would be lower than the variance in the CPS data, because the latter captures variation across individuals within jobs, in addition to the variation across jobs and establishments captured in the ECI data.
on the proportion of an establishment's workforce in each job within the establishment, but the sampling scheme is, to some degree, self-weighting. The data do include weights for the total number of workers in each establishment. We use these weights to compute the weighted mean of the variances across establishments.
The left side of figure 2 shows MV annually for wages & salaries and voluntary benefits. 
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We calculate the variance across establishments of the mean log level of compensation within each establishment, that is,
The 1-digit industry breakdowns used here comprises nine Amajor industry groups@: 12 mining; construction; nondurable manufacturing; durable manufacturing; transportation, communications, and public utilities; wholesale trade; retail trade; finance, insurance, and real estate; and services. The 2-, 3-, and 4-digit industries refer to SIC codes.
These variances, shown on the right side of figure 2, also rose over the period, with the increase for wages & salaries heavily concentrated in the early 1980s. If decompression were the only thing going on, we would not expect to see these variances increase.
Another way to summarize the evolution of within-establishment and betweenestablishment variances is to look at a more general decomposition of the overall variance. Figure   3 apportions the total variance across {job x establishment} cells into the share attributable to industry at the 1-to 4-digit levels, the share attributable to the establishment, and the residual variance, which is attributable to jobs within establishments. We do this in a nonparametric 12 fashion by attributing to 1-digit industry the amount of the variance that can be "explained" by 1-digit industry in an OLS regression; attributing to 2-digit industry the difference between the amount that can be explained by 2-digit industry and the amount that can be explained by 1-digit industry, and so on, treating the establishment as one level of industry disaggregation beyond the 4-digit level. The variance that cannot be explained by the establishment in an OLS regression we attribute to jobs within establishments.
Concentrating first on wages & salaries, it is notable how much of the variance can be explained by industry alone, without reference to the individual establishment or job. The onedigit industry alone can account for about 1/6 of the total variance on average, and the four-digit industry can (cumulatively) account for slightly more than half (53 percent on average). Of the remaining 47 percent, the establishment and the job within the establishment account for roughly equal shares. For our purposes, however, the important point is that the share attributed to the job has risen relative to the share attributed to the establishment. While this is consistent with the hypothesis of decompression, most of the change in these relative shares took place during the 1980s, which may not be the most likely timing under that hypothesis.
The establishment assumes greater prominence in explaining the variance of (log) voluntary benefits. Nevertheless, as was the case with wages & salaries, the share attributed to Professional and technical; executive and administrative; sales, administrative support, 13 precision production and repair; machine operator; transportation; handling and labor; service occupations.
In principle, a finer level of industry disaggregation would be preferable. We know the 14 4-digit industry of each establishment. However, the sizes of the 4-digit industry x occupation cells tend to be unacceptably small. The choice of 3-digit industry balances the demands of theory with the adequacy of the data.
the job rises over time while the share attributed to the establishment within industry has fallen. In this case, the change in relative shares continued into the mid-1990s.
We next calculate the variance across establishments but within occupations. We argued in section II that this variance should decline under the decompression hypothesis, while the hypotheses related to skill-biased technical change imply that this variance should rise.
Unfortunately, for most of the sample period, we can identify the occupation of a job only at the level of the major occupation group (MOG), which is a much coarser taxonomy than we 13 would like. Only beginning in 1993 can we identify the occupation of each job at a finer level of disaggregation (3-digit Census occupations). Partly to make up for this deficiency, and more generally to hone in on categories within which workers' mobility across establishments is likely to be great, we further divided the sample by industry. Thus, figure 4 shows the average variance 
V. Panel Regressions
The decompositions presented thus far provide little support for the notion that compensation has become more flexible, in the particular sense laid out above, over the period 1980-1999. In this section we subject the question to greater scrutiny by exploiting the panel Because observations are defined as occupations or jobs within establishments, our data 15 are not directly affected by changes in the mix of jobs within a given establishment. However, as noted above, the characteristics of the workers in a given job may change over time, which may contaminate our results.
The ECI program spreads out the replenishment of the establishments in an industry 16 over several quarters. This sample design ensures that all industries are adequately represented in the three-month changes that make up the published ECI. But the levels may change abruptly when a large part of an industry is replenished between our year-apart observations. nature of the data.
In order to keep the sample representative of the economy, after a time each establishment in the sample is replaced by another in the same industry. This periodic "replenishment" means that the changes we observe over time my be due to changes in the behavior of individual establishments, or to changes in the composition of the sample as establishments with one set of compensation practices are replaced by establishments with different practices. We can 15 distinguish between these two avenues for change by controlling for observed characteristics of the establishments and by including establishment-effects in the estimation. This also allows us to abstract from jumps in the variances, especially within particular industries, that replenishment may create at some points in the sample.
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Within-establishment variance
We begin by controlling for the observed attributes of each establishment. Using weighted OLS, we estimated Indeed, the average variance is smaller in establishments with at least one unionized 18 occupation if we look at the data without conditioning on anything else. But the coefficient turns positive once we control for the industry and occupation mix. Even here, as it turns out, establishments in service industries drive the higher dispersion within establishments with some unionization. Excluding these establishments leads to lower dispersion in compensation within atleast-partially unionized establishments, and this lower dispersion is particularly pronounced among manufacturing industries. The results for selected variables are shown in the first three columns of table 2. Of particular note is that establishments with at least one unionized occupation surveyed show more dispersion in the levels of compensation than establishments with no unionized occupations surveyed --a result that is out of step with the conventional wisdom. The coefficients are 18 otherwise unremarkable. In results not shown, dispersion in the levels tends to be greatest in the services and finance, insurance, and real estate industries, and least in transportation, communications, and public utilities.
In principle, equation (11) allows the observed attributes of establishments to change over time. However, by design of the ECI program, the elements of X in equation (11) are fixed when an establishment enters the sample. Any evolution of these attributes will only show up only as the sample is replenished.
Of course, our data likely omit many relevant attributes of the establishments. To account for this possibility, we estimated a version of equation (11) using fixed establishment-effects, , i so that the estimates derive solely from changes over time within establishments.
(11') V = + Y + Z + ,
Obviously, we must rely on equation (11) to provide estimates of which types of establishments tend to have greater or lesser dispersion, but (11') gives us the cleanest reading on trends in dispersion at individual establishments over time.
Our main focus here is on whether there has been a trend in the variances of pay. To answer this question, the coefficients on the year dummies are plotted in figure 5 . When the establishment effects are not included in the regression (the solid lines), there is an upward trend in the variances of (log) wages & salaries, and an upward trend in the variance of (log) benefits as well.
The coefficients on the year dummies from the regression of wages & salaries jumps up notably in 1990. However, when establishment effects are included (the dashed line), the jump fades away. More generally, the fixed-effects estimates for wages & salaries also rise over the period, but the overall increase is considerably smaller than the increase without the fixed-effects.
It is also spread more evenly over the two decades. If we are to take the upward trend as an indication of increased flexibility exercised by employers exercise in setting pay, then one may interpret the difference between the two regressions as indicating that there has been some increase in flexibility, on average, within establishments, but that over time establishments exhibiting less flexibility have been replaced by establishments exhibiting more flexibility, and this shift in composition is reflected in the changing make-up of the ECI sample as that sample is replenished to remain current.
The fixed-effects also reduce the upward slope in the estimates for voluntary benefits. In
The increase in the variance of health insurance appears to be driven by changes in its employers' costs for health insurance and pension plans, not any part of the costs that are paid by employees. Also, the component for retirement plans lumps together defined benefit and defined contribution-type. Particularly for defined-benefit type plans, then, this component will reflect conditions (stock market valuations, for example) that affect employers' costs even if they do not affect employees' expected benefits.
Between-establishment variance
The estimated upward movement in the within-establishment variance is consistent with either an increase in flexibility or skill-biased technical change in its purer form, as opposed to the sorting hypothesis of skill-biased technical change, as the dominant influence over this period.
However, decompression and skill-bias have different implications for the between-establishment, within-occupation-and-industry variances, to which we now turn.
The estimated trends in between-establishment/within-industry/within-MOG variation, derived from versions of equations (11) and (11'), are shown in figure 7 . As in section IV, we are interested in the variation between similar establishments for similar jobs, so the dependent variable in these regressions refers to the variance between establishments within each 3-digit industry, calculated separately for jobs in each major occupation group (MOG). That is, any jobs within an establishment that are in the same MOG in a given year are averaged together, resulting
Of course, not every MOG is represented in every establishment. this procedure does not control for other forms of attrition, but we expect attrition outside of replenishment to be a minor problem.
As in (11') above, the only variables on the right-hand side of these regressions refer to the year and to the state unemployment rate. Here, however, the latter must be modified to apply to using the 3-digit industry rather than the establishment as the unit of analysis. Accordingly, we include two variables for the state unemployment rate: the mean and the variance of the state unemployment rates of the establishments in the industry in each year.
For wages & salaries, the regressions of between-establishment, within-occupation-andindustry variances produce year coefficients that move up during the 1980s, and drift back down over the following ten years. This would be consistent with the idea that skill-biased change was the dominant factor during the period of the most notable increase in across-person wage inequality, while decompression has been the dominant theme thereafter. However, the fixed-effects estimates decline pretty steadily over the twenty years. If skill-biased change were the dominant factor during the 1980s, it would have to be the case that the widening of skill differentials and increase in residual variance across persons that we saw in that decade came about primarily because the entry of new establishments increased the between-establishment variance for similar jobs.
The results for benefits are not as smooth, but are similar to the results for wages & salaries in that the fixed-effects estimates fall gradually over the 20 year sample period. The declining variance between-establishments but within MOGs and industries argues in favor of the notion that compensation practices have become more flexible in the sense of moving away from internal considerations that favor wage compression.
Cyclicality
Once we abstract from changes in the composition of establishments in the sample, and presumably in the economy, we find that the within-establishment variance of both wages & salaries and of benefits has risen over the past twenty years, primarily between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s. At the same time, the between-establishment variance within MOG and 3-digit industry has fallen for both wages & salaries and benefits. These developments are what we would expect to have seen under the hypothesis of decompression. We should note, however, that despite the recessions in 1982 and 1990, over this twenty-year period taken as a whole the unemployment rate was trending downward. Thus, the patterns we see in the variances could be a reflection of the general tightening of the labor market rather than a more structural change in compensation practices. Indeed, decompression itself could be a response to a sellers' market for workers, with types of workers in shortest supply becoming less willing to trade higher compensation for the long-term stability that may come with wage compression.
To confidently differentiate between structural and "cyclical" characterizations of the patterns in the variances, one would need a longer sample with more cyclical variation, which is not available from the ECI data. Instead, we approached the question by regressing the coefficients on the year variables from the fixed-effects regressions on the demographicallyadjusted unemployment rate. The residuals from these regressions appear in figure 8. These residuals exhibit much less of a trend (either upward or downward) than the year coefficients themselves. Of course, the same would be true if we regressed the year coefficients on a time trend, and, in fact, if one regresses the time dummies on both the unemployment rate and a linear trend, the unemployment rate fails to explain any significant portion of the patterns in the variances. These results are far from conclusive, of course, and for now we must leave the question open.
VI. Conclusion
We have attempted to bring data to bear on the widespread perception that employers have become more flexible in setting compensation, in the sense that the market value of the skills involved in a particular job have become a more important consideration, while the internal distribution of compensation within the firm has become less important. We argue that an increase in flexibility, or "decompression", should manifest itself in an increase in the variance of pay across occupations within establishments, and a decrease in the variance of pay within occupations across similar establishments. While skill-biased technical change, which has been advanced as an explanation for the well-documented increase in earnings inequality across persons in the 1980s, may also predict an increase in the within-establishment variance, it would be more consistent with an increase in the variance within occupations across similar establishments.
We used the underlying micro-data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Employment Cost Index program, and find patterns that support the hypothesis of decompression. The variances across occupations within establishments has risen, and, once we abstract from changes in the mix of establishments that make up the sample, the variance within occupations across similar establishments has fallen. Unfortunately for the research, the two decades we are able to study constitute a period of fairly steadily declining unemployment, making it difficult to know whether the patterns we observe are more cyclical or structural in nature. Notes: Each regression includes major industry dummies, major occupation dummies, state effects, and year dummies. Standard errors appear in parentheses. * indicates significance at the 5% level.
